

ON THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE SAMIAN WAR

(PLATE I)

UNLIKE much else in the Pentecontaetia, the chronology of the Samian War, its antecedents included, has apparently evoked such little critical interest that an almost casual treatment of the subject is observable in modern works. Nesselhauf, for example, annotated his brief discussion of the Samian War with a reference to Busolt and Beloch 'for the details'.¹ Each scholar provides a radically different chronology from the other.² Indeed, the range of dates postulated by modern writers is remarkable considering the relatively small span of time, two years, in which the events appear to have unfolded. Beloch and the authors of *ATL*³ date the war between Samos and Miletus, which ultimately caused the revolt, in summer 441 B.C.; Busolt set the war in March–April 440 B.C., E. Meyer a shade earlier.⁴ Some scholars fail to specify the date (Nesselhauf, Meiggs).⁵ The beginning of the revolt itself has been placed in spring 440 B.C. by Sealey, among others;⁶ Gomme and Meiggs date it in early summer,⁷ Busolt, strangely, in early July. The direct cause of the revolt, the installation of the democracy at Samos (Thuc. i 115.3), is little discussed, much less fixed in date.⁸ The democracy was not established in a day: it therefore requires consideration in any chronological reconstruction. Finally, the end of the war has been variously set in late winter, early spring and early summer 439 B.C.

Such uncertainty is surprising since our evidence is abundant and also specific enough to allow us to make reasonably firm chronological estimates. Indeed, our fortunate possession of mutually independent data—the historical tradition and the monumental evidence—provides us with the opportunity to attempt precision in a degree usually beyond our expectations. However we may separately interpret Thucydides' relative chronology or the random evidence of the stones, these data, when taken in combination, yield knowledge greater than the sum of its parts.

I. THE LITERARY TRADITION

The chronological framework is established by Thucydides and the (Atthidographic) scholium at Aristophanes *Wasps* 283. Thucydides (i 115.2) dated the Samian quarrel with Miletus which provoked the establishment of a democratic government at Samos to the sixth year (441/40) of the Thirty Years Peace: ἔκτω δὲ ἔτει Σαμίοις καὶ Μιλήσιοις πόλεμος ἐγένετο περὶ Πριήνης, καὶ οἱ Μιλήσιοι ἐλασσούμενοι τῷ πολέμῳ παρ' Ἀθηναίους ἐλθόντες κατεβόων τῶν Σαμίων. ξυνοπέλαβοντο δὲ καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς Σάμου ἄνδρες ἰδιῶται νεωτερίσαι βουλόμενοι τὴν πολιτείαν. (3) πλεύσαντες οὖν Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς Σάμον ναυσὶ τεσσαράκοντα δημοκρατίαν κατέστησαν, καὶ ὁμήρους ἔλαβον τῶν Σαμίων πενήτηκοντα μὲν παῖδας, ἴσους δὲ ἄνδρας, καὶ κατέθεντο ἐς Λῆμμον, καὶ φρουρὰν ἐγκαταλιπόντες ἀνεχώρησαν. According to the scholiast, the Samian War fell in the years 441/0, 440/39: τὰ περὶ Σάμον ἰθ' ἔτει πρότερον ἐπὶ Τιμοκλέους γέγονε καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐξῆς Μορυχίδου.

Nothing can be said, for the moment, about the date of the Samian–Milesian War or the establishment of the Samian democracy. The views that have been expressed in the literature are subjective impressions of the *minimum* period of time required for the events described by Thucydides in 115.4–5. That estimate is then simply connected to the presumed date of the Samian Revolt. Thucydides' account resists quantification and can be accommodated to any number of reasonable hypotheses. But Thucydides' account of the Samian Revolt itself is more fruitful.

Thucydides affirms that the Byzantines joined in the rebellion (115.5); and it is independently known that they paid tribute in spring 440 (*ATL* i p. 250). This information, however, has its

¹ *Klio* Beiheft 30 (1933) 47 n. 3.

² Busolt, *Griech. Gesch.* iii.1 542 n. 4; Beloch, *Griech. Gesch.* ii².2 215 f.

³ *ATL* iii 307 f.

⁴ *GdA* iv (1901 edn) 64.

⁵ Meiggs, *Athenian Empire* 188 f.

⁶ *A History of the Greek City-States* (1976) 310.

⁷ Meiggs 190; Gomme *HCT* 390.

⁸ Busolt and Meyer are exceptions, both placing it in spring 440.

limitations: although it permits us to deduce a date after which the Byzantines rebelled, it does not necessarily entail, as has been generally inferred, that the Samians also rebelled no sooner than the springtime of 440. For the inference is uncertain or worse that the Byzantines rose simultaneously with the Samians and that (therefore) the Samian Revolt must postdate the celebration of the Dionysia (late March–early April), when the tribute was paraded in the theatre.⁹ Its sole support is the belief that Thucydides' deference to strict relative chronology explains the emplacement of his reference to the Byzantines in 115.5—just after the Samian *coup* and the preparations then undertaken against Miletus and just before the Athenians began their countermeasures against them (116.1). But this may be to view the passage too mechanically: if the Byzantine uprising affected the course of the Samian War (as it evidently did not) the argument would carry more weight. In fact, the notice looks rather like a footnote, even an addition.¹⁰ The phrase is intrusive and disturbs the flow of the context, for what the Athenians 'perceived' and responded to was not the Byzantine uprising, which they ignored, but the vigorous activities of the Samians. There are also general reasons to suppose that the Byzantine rebellion followed the Samian after a lapse of time. Thucydides does not imply in 115.4 that the Samian conspirators attempted to induce a concerted uprising of the allies; in fact, the secrecy of their plot was essential to its success. Secondly, it is not likely that the Byzantines would have risked their city in a perilous enterprise unless the prospects of Samian success seemed good—when, for example, the Samians managed to break the Athenian blockade and there was reason to believe that Persia was entering the war.¹¹ Consequently, it is safest to assume no more from the rebellion of the Byzantines after their payment of tribute than that the Samian Revolt was already in progress by that time.

Evidence from the strategic lists confirms that the war began in the campaign year of 440 and also permits us to date one of its stages with some degree of precision. Androtion's list of 'the ten generals at Samos'¹² does not include Thoukydides, Hagnon, Phormion, Tlempolemos and Antikles, all of whom are named by Thucydides in 117.2 as bringing reinforcements to Perikles after his renewal of the blockade of Samos. It follows that two different boards of generals were active in the campaign; and since Thucydides' sequence of events follows in rapid progression without allowance for a winter hiatus, it is clear that both the generals of 441/0 (Androtion's) and those of 440/39 (those named by Thucydides) were all of them active in the year 440 B.C. More important for present purposes, the same evidence also indicates with great probability that Perikles' return from Kaunos and Karia must have occurred not long before mid-June, when the new calendar-year began (Hekatombaion 1, 440), the new board of generals took office and their reinforcements arrived. For we may certainly assume, in the absence of contrary indications, that the newly elected generals perforce acted as swiftly as possible, even to the point of organizing their expedition before the new archon-year began. Time was of the essence: the crisis was obvious and urgent (*cf.* Thuc. viii 76.4) well before Hekatombaion 1; and the new generals, with their sixty triremes, were needed at once if the Samians were to be decisively overpowered. The following events therefore occurred by mid-June: the battle of Tragia, the subsequent dispatch of forty vessels which facilitated the investment of Samos, Perikles' departure thereafter to head off the Persians, the Samian disruption of the blockade and their fourteen-day-long control of the sea, Perikles' return and renewal of the siege and, finally, the dispatch of sixty additional vessels under the command of the new generals (116–117.2).

One would think that it would be an easy matter, with the aid of this information, to compute the date of the end of the war since we know from Thucydides that it came to a close in the ninth month of the siege (117.3): *καὶ ναυμαχίαν μὲν τινα βραχείαν ἐποίησαντο οἱ Σάμιοι, ¹³ ἀδύνατοι*

⁹ The date, in any case, is only a terminus. We do not know how much in advance of the Dionysia the tribute was brought to Athens.

¹⁰ To see this, it must be quoted within its surrounding context (115.5–116.1): *(οἱ Σάμιοι) πρῶτον μὲν τῷ δήμῳ ἐπανέστησαν καὶ ἐκράτησαν τῶν πλείστων, ἔπειτα τοὺς ὀμίλους ἐκκλέψαντες ἐκ Λήμνου τοὺς αὐτῶν ἀπέστησαν, καὶ τοὺς φρουροὺς τοὺς Ἀθηναίων καὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας οἵ ἦσαν παρὰ σφίσι ἐξέδωσαν Πισσοῦθνη, ἐπὶ τε Μίλητον εὐθὺς παρεσκευάζοντο στρατεῦν. ξυναπέστησαν δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ Βυζάντιοι. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ὡς ἤσθοντο, πλεύσαντες*

ναυσὶν ἐξήκοντα ἐπὶ Σάμου... ἐναυμάχησαν πρὸς Τραγία κτλ.

¹¹ Thuc. i 116.3: *Περικλῆς δὲ λαβὼν ἐξήκοντα ναῦς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐφορμουσῶν ὤχετο κατὰ τάχος ἐπὶ Καύνου καὶ Καρίας, ἐσαγγελθέντων ὅτι Φοίνισσαι νῆες ἐπ' αὐτοὺς πλέουσιν ὤχετο γὰρ καὶ ἐκ τῆς Σάμου πέντε ναοὶ Στρησαγόρας καὶ ἄλλοι ἐπὶ τὰς Φοινίσσας.*

¹² FGrH 324 F 38.

¹³ Apparently just after the arrival of the new generals of 440/39.

ὄντες ἀντίσχειν ἐξεπολιορκήθησαν ἐνάτω μηνὶ καὶ προσεχώρησαν ὁμολογία κτλ. But, as Gomme asks (*ad loc.*), was that 'eight months after Perikles' return from the coast of Karia, or after the circumvallation was complete, or after Tragia, or after the outbreak of the war?' Gomme was probably right to opt for the second alternative¹⁴—in which case the war ended no later than January 439—but it is impossible to be certain. The most that can be said is that the war can have ended no later than February since the latest terminus Thucydides allows is Perikles' return from the Karian coast, which must be set before mid-June.

So much, then, for the chronological indications provided by the literary tradition. The dates of the beginning and the end of the Samian War remain tantalizingly uncertain; and we still do not know the date of the ἀρχὴ κακῶν, the establishment of the Samian democracy. By a lucky stroke of fate, the inscriptional record will allow us to resolve these questions.

II. IG 1² 293

This fragment (ML no. 55), found on the Acropolis, is now in the Epigraphic Museum at Athens. It contains developed Attic writing, stoichedon, but with an unknown length of line. An excellent photograph was published by Meritt in *AFD* 43. I ignore here another small fragment conjecturally associated with it by Meritt, *AJA* xxxviii (1934) 69 (see below p. 10f. for its incorporation into lines 7–10 of ML no. 55): if the attribution is correct, the stone is nevertheless too fragmentary to help in the restoration of this stele.

..ς...εκ - - - - -
 ...εσε - - - - -
 ...σοσι - - - - -
 ...Φρεά[ρριος - - - - -
 5 ΗΑΑΤΤΤ[- - - - -
 Ἀθηναῖοι ἀνέλοσαν? - -
 πρὸς Σαμί[ς - - - - -
 Ἀθηναίας π[- - - - -
 ς, τοῖς Φυρό[μαχος ἐγραμμάτευε - - -
 10 τευε ταμία[ι - - - - - ἐ -
 χς Οἶο, Νασ[- - - - -
 ΗΗΗΗΑΑΤΤΤΤ[- - - - -
 παρὰ ταμιῶν - - - - -
 ιος Περαι[εύς - - - - -
 15 ερον τοῖδε [- - - - -
 Ἀφιδναῖος [- - - - -
 ΠΗΗΗΗΗΑΑΤΤΤΤ¹⁵[- - - - -
 χσύμπαντο[ς κεφάλαιον - - -
 ΧΗ[Η]ΗΗ[- - - - -
 - - - - -

This fragment records three payments made by the treasurers of Athena (line 8 with 13) totalling more than 1400 talents. Since the three figures, 128 T.+, 368 T.+, 908 T.+, are combined in a total, designated as such (line 18), which is also the sum of their numbers, the fragment should be regarded as a self-contained unit—even if it may have been part of a stele containing material above it or below it. It follows that these sums were mutually related and (therefore) organized chronologically.¹⁶ Their mutual relation can only have been one of two

¹⁴ Thucydides' use of the same verb, *πολιορκεῖν*, in 116.2 and 117.3 suggests conscious mutual relation.

¹⁵ The first printing of ML has a misprint here; the figure is given as 853 T.

¹⁶ I am grateful to D. M. Lewis and Ronald Stroud for knowledge of the fact that the numbers in lines 5 and 19 are written *in rasura*, the bands of erasure running the full width of the stone. The treasurers evidently made an error

in their computation of the first sum. That it was their error and not a mason's follows from its having affected the total given (and recomputed) in line 19. The mistake was perhaps uncovered and rectified by the *logistae*. It suggests, of course, that the sum written on line 5 was an aggregate figure. To infer more than this from the erasures would I think be guesswork. We cannot even say whether the number originally written in line 5 was

kinds. Either the payments have nothing more in common with each other than the identity of their source, namely, the treasurers of Athena, or they have been united by the purpose for which they were spent, all the payments having been devoted to the same categorical end. *IG i² 324+* (ML no. 72) provides an example of the first type: in this list of the sums of money loaned by the treasurers of Athena, the point of material importance is not the identity of the recipients or their specific use of the money (though this is of course stated) but simply their receipt of the loans. The loans are itemized through four successive years, a total being provided for each of the years separately (lines 15 f., 24 f., 34 ff., 46 f.), all of this culminating in the collective total given in lines 48–51. *IG i² 295+* (ML no. 61), is an example of the second type. This inscription records the expenditures of two successive boards of Athena's treasurers (434/3, 433/2) upon a single object, military operations at Corcyra. Now our fragment, though it differs from both these examples in that it is a summary account while they are particularized, clearly conforms to the second type. For since the total consists of three sums, not four, it is obviously not, like *IG i² 324+*, the usual sort of record of the monies expended by four successive boards of the treasurers of Athena rendering their accounts from Greater Panathenaea to Greater Panathenaea.¹⁷ We are therefore entitled to believe that this self-contained fragment records the expenses for what the Athenians regarded as a single category, like the expenditures at Corcyra. Consequently, since Samians are mentioned in line 7 and the sums recorded are of an extraordinary size, it is reasonable to conclude that this record is relevant to the events described by Thucydides in i 115.2 ff.

In addition, both the summary nature of this account and the fact that the treasurers were listed individually in lines 4, 10 f., and 15 f. make the assumption cogent that each of these groups were different boards of treasurers individually responsible for the payments registered in lines 5, 12 and 17. For the presence of three aggregate figures (such sums were surely not bestowed *en bloc*) coupled with three lists of magistrates manifestly implies the allocation of responsibility to three distinct groups of treasurers. The presumption that these expenditures were annual and each group of treasurers a separate board is, moreover, confirmed by the magnitude of the sums involved. 128 T., 368 T., and 908 T. are best explained as yearly aggregates. Thus, if this inscription records the expenditures incurred because of the Samian affair, they must have been paid out by three boards of treasurers who held office in successive years.

This analysis differs substantially from the currently prevailing interpretation of the fragment. According to the conventional view, which derives from Meritt's study in *AFD*,¹⁸ the payments on the stone do not stand in chronological order; the treasurers listed on line 4 were apparently members of the same boards as those named both in lines 10 f. and 15 f.; and the money was expended on a dual object, Byzantium and Samos, the payment of 128 T. + allegedly having been spent on the subjugation of Byzantium, while the other two sums went for Samian operations in 441/0 and 440/39. The text of Meiggs and Lewis (no. 55) embodies this interpretation and reads as follows:

.. 5 . . . ε κ - - - - -
 . . . ε σ ε - - - - -
 . . . σ ο σ ι - - - - -
 . . . Φ ρ ε ά [ρ ρ ι ο ς] - - - - -
 5 Η Α Α Π Τ Τ Τ [- - - - -

'Αθηναίοι ἀνέλοσαν ἐπὶ Τιμοκλέος καὶ ἐπὶ Μορυχίδο ἀρχόντων 'Αθηναίοισι, ἐς τὸν
 πρὸς Σαμίο[ς πόλεμον τάδε· τάδε ἐν τοῖν δυοῖν ἔτοῖν ἡοι ταμίαι παρέδοσα[ν τὸν τῆς]
 'Αθηναίας Π[ολιάδος στρατηγοῖσι τοῖς πρὸς Σαμῖος· ἀνάλομα παρὰ ταμι]ὸν ἐ[κ πόλεο]-
 ς, ἡοῖς Φυρό[μαχος ἐγραμμάτευεν, ἐπὶ τῆς βολῆς, ἡῆι 12 πρὸτ]ος ἐ[γραμμά]-

smaller or larger than what replaced it. One might argue, perhaps, that the need for erasure suggests that all the returns were not yet in when the stone was carved—so that the first item on the stone was actually the last in the chronological series (i.e. the subjugation of Byzantium). Such an explanation would not be cogent. We are not entitled to suppose that documents of this kind were given over to a mason *in medias res*. An error in the records therefore permits no conclusions about the time of its commission.

¹⁷ The principle is well known; see, for example, besides *IG i² 324+*, 306, *IG i² 92*, lines 27 f. (ML no. 58 B).

¹⁸ Pp. 42–7, revised in *AJP* lv (1934) 365 f. Prior to Meritt's study it was held that the amount in line 5 was spent by the treasurers of 441/0, the next two amounts having been spent in 440/39. The possibility that two payments were made in the conciliar year 440/39 is also noted by Meiggs and Lewis.

- 10 τευε· ταμία[ι.....45.....Εὐ]βο[λίδες ἐ]-
 χς Οἶο Νασ[- - - - -]
 ΠΠΠΠΠΠΠΠΠΠ[- - - - -]
 παρὰ ταμιῶ[ν ἐκ πόλεος, τοῖς Δεμόστρατος ἐγραμμάτευεν, ἐπὶ τῆς βολῆς, ἡεὶ Ἐπιχαρ]-
 ἴνος Περαι[εὺς πρῶτος ἐγραμμάτευε, στρατηγοῖσι τοῖς πρὸς Σαμῖος ἀνάλομα δεύτ]-
- 15 ερον· τοῖδε [ταμίαι ἔσαν - - - - -]
 Ἐφιδναῖος [- - - - -]
 ΠΠΠΠΠΠΠΠΠΠ[- - - - -]
 χσύμπαντο[ς κεφάλαιον τὸ ἐς Βυζαντίος καὶ ἐς Σαμῖος ἀναλόματος - -]
 Ξ Π Π Π Π [- - - - -]
 - - - - -

It will be recognized at once, I think, that these restorations lack all evidential value. The double archon-date in line 6, the ‘two years’ of 7, the ‘second payment’ of 14 f. have simply been linked to the text and express an opinion of the date of the Samian War without any assistance from the preserved portion of the stone.¹⁹ Furthermore, a wedge has unnaturally been driven between the first sum and the last two with the invocation of Byzantium in line 18, thus violating the internal logic of what looks to be a straightforward record of three chronologically progressive expenses devoted to the same end. The account has now become a very peculiar thing: expenditures have not only been allocated for unattested activity at Byzantium but this sum must of necessity be credited to *two* boards of Athena’s treasurers, while the money spent at Samos is instead precisely allocated to each of the same two boards. What explains so idiosyncratic a view?

The suspicion that this interpretation rests on considerations purely extrinsic to the stone itself is amply confirmed by Meritt’s discussion, where it is clear that he sought to accommodate the fragment to what he considered the exigencies of the literary tradition. For Meritt’s starting-point, the discovery that Phylomachos (line 9) could not have been secretary of the treasurers of Athena as earlier had been supposed,²⁰ by no means led in the direction he finally took. Making Phylomachos secretary of the treasurers of Athena in 441/0 simply provided a new date for the expenditure of the sum of money engraved on line 12. Meritt’s general interpretation, on the other hand, though it utilized the new datum, actually hinged on the fact that the ancients (Isocrates xv 111, Diodorus xii 28.3, Nepos *Timotheus* 1.2) seem uniformly to have held that the siege of Samos—by which they undoubtedly meant the ‘war’—cost the Athenians 1200 T.²¹ Meritt wished to reconcile this figure with those of IG i² 293. The only way to do so was to subdivide the total by divorcing the first sum from the last two (thereby creating a record without parallel).²² By referring these last two to the expenses sustained at Samos while assigning the first to costs allegedly sustained at Byzantium, Meritt could smooth the ‘discrepancy between the epigraphical and literary evidence’.²³ For 1276 T. + evidently ‘corresponds well enough’²⁴ with the literary figure to justify the inference.

¹⁹ The one restoration, in lines 14 f.—ἀνάλομα δεύτ] | ερον—which might appear to give a certain cogency to the current interpretation is by no means safe. Quite possibly the word underlying ερον is *ἡι* | ερόν, whether or not we dare restore ταμίαι τὸν *ἡι* | ερον τοῖδε [ἔσαν; cf. IG i² 91, ML no. 58 A, lines 14 f.: καθάπερ τὸς τὸν *ἡι* | [ερό]ν τὸν τῆς Ἀθηναίας.

²⁰ AFD 40–2.

²¹ Some emendation of the texts of Isocrates and Diodorus is required, but it seems simple enough and has been generally approved. Interest in the sum expended was no doubt incited by Thucydides’ reference to the demand for reparations (i 117.3).

²² IG i² 296 (AFD 8–83), the record of 432/1, deserves attention in this context. For though this inscription records expenditures made in two different theatres—Macedonia–Potidaea and the Peloponnese—it is important to note that both these regions are kept separate in the

record. The first section (after the heading, which we do not possess in its entirety) is devoted exclusively to payments made in the northern theatre, and it culminates with a total of all the expenditures made there. Then comes a vacant line and, after that, a listing of Peloponnesian costs. Potidaea, it is true, is grouped with Macedonia in this inscription as part of the same category yielding a common total. But that is not analogous to what is alleged of our inscription. If Byzantium is dragged into it then the three expenditures (as aggregates) were all of them partially Byzantine and partially Samian. There is no warrant for selecting one of them and assigning it to alleged Byzantine expenses as if the campaign were regarded as separate.

²³ AFD 46.

²⁴ ML 151. Meiggs is considerably more skeptical in *Athenian Empire* 192.

This procedure would be inappropriate even if the reasoning that guided it had been sound. Nothing is gained from the interpolation of received opinion into empty letter-spaces except the dangerous illusion of its corroboration. In the meanwhile, potentially valuable evidence is stultified. In this case, there is no necessity or even justification to suppose that the monumental evidence and the literary tradition correlate. Historians are naturally selective, treasuries are not: monies were expended for more than the epochal siege. Consequently, we may let the stone itself, with its three sums and three boards of treasurers, point the way for us, thereby recognizing that if the events preceding the Samian War are of less interest to us and to ancient writers than the Samian War itself, it does not follow that the treasurers of Athena were indifferent to their cost. In short, we have every reason to suppose that this record included, in addition to the costs of the Samian War, the expenses incurred by that first squadron of forty vessels that enforced the dissolution of the Samian government and protected the establishment of the new democracy. Let us therefore interpret this fragment without constraint as independent evidence in its own right and learn what it tells us about the sequence of events we have been attempting to fix in time.

III. THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE SAMIAN WAR

If three different boards of the treasurers of Athena expended money on Samian affairs in the time partly covered by the Samian War, they must have been the boards of 442/1, 441/0, 440/39.²⁵ Now though such a date as 442/1 may seem on first appearance to be too early to be relevant to the Samian episode (which may well explain why this obvious possibility has not been explored), further consideration reveals its propriety. The board of 442/1 left office a month into the new civil year of Timokles (441/0), and it is therefore possible to date the establishment of the first democracy at Samos—costing 128 T. +—in the sixth year of the Thirty Years Peace. Admittedly, we must be prepared to place this event, or at least the war between Miletus and Samos, somewhat earlier than Thucydides seems to allow. It is not beyond the bounds of possibility, however, that Thucydides was a trifle careless in 115.2–3. ἔκτωρ ἔτει was perhaps used proleptically, Thucydides' firm date being that of the revolution at Samos when the democracy became 'official'. It is also conceivable that Thucydides telescoped the antecedents of the Samian War. He was not, after all, recording this material contemporaneously with the events. In either case, the margin of difference is too small to excite serious doubts about the putative evidence from our fragment: the Athenians installed the democracy in mid-summer 441 B.C. when the treasurers of 442/1 were still in office.

The amount expended, 126 T. +, is not only reasonable in itself but also reminds us of the danger of assuming that such 'events' came about in an instant of time. We may assume the cost of a trireme to have been one talent monthly;²⁶ and that the forty ships remained in Samian waters for a period of two to three months is completely understandable. In the first place, the establishment of the democracy, which commenced with the appearance of the fleet at Samos, required deliberation and care. The Athenians must have worked in concert with those Samians who had helped to instigate the revolution, not to mention those at Samos who were favourable to it. These elements of the population were not to be antagonized. Consequently, embassies will have been dispatched to Athens to iron out the details, determine the identity of the hostages, negotiate about the size of the garrison, the new government's 'rights' and so forth. Beyond this, an Athenian military presence was necessary to cow the dissidents and keep the exiles away. The fleet will have remained at Samos until peace and quiet were restored.

If the new democracy was established in June–July as *IG* i² 293 seems to indicate, a somewhat longer pause preceded the great rebellion than we have presumed. The delay is scarcely problematical; the presumption merely reflects our penchant for calculating a series of events in terms of the time they seem minimally to require. If Thucydides' account conveys the impression that the Samians acted with rapidity, we may recall that from his perspective in time the hiatus

²⁵ The alternative (441/0, 440/39, 439/8) can be excluded not only because Demostratos (not Phyromachos) was apparently secretary of the treasurers of Athena in 440/39 but because of the impossibly large sum (908

T. +) which then must have been spent *after the siege* in 439/8.

²⁶ See Dover at Thucydides vi 31.3, Meiggs, *Athenian Empire* 259.

was inconsequential: what mattered to him were the facts of the plot. But it is self-evident that the Samian emigrés would have chosen their time with caution. Whenever the institution of the democracy, they can scarcely have acted before the advent of winter, when the Athenian navy was dry-docked. Beyond this, we are in a poor position to make inferences, for we have no knowledge of the events on which the Samians necessarily counted. How long does it take to persuade people to join in a plot? If the Samians counted on the aid of a Phoenician fleet, when could it be expected? In sum, the hiatus postulated between the imposition of the democracy in mid-summer 441 and the outbreak of the revolt in early spring is intrinsically unobjectionable.

IG i² 293 also permits us to refine conclusions already reached about the chronology of the Samian War itself. Significant equations arise from the size of the last two sums, 368 T. and 908 T., when taken in conjunction with the terminal date of the payment of the first of these, namely, Hekatombaion 28, 440.

(i) The treasurers of 441/0 paid out 368 T. +. When they left office in mid-July, 160 ships were present at Samos.²⁷ However, 60 had been at the siege for only one month's time (those commanded by the new generals of 440/39: Thuc. i 117.2). Since a month's pay (from mid-June to mid-July, which we may loosely approximate with Hekatombaion 28) for these ships and for the other hundred already at Samos amounted to 160 T., it is apparent that about 200 T. had been spent by the Athenians on the Samian War from the time of its inception to mid-June, Hekatombaion 1. Now of the one hundred Athenian vessels active within this period, sixty had been in operation from the beginning (116.1), the other forty coming 'later' (116.2). If we assume the delay of a month before this reinforcing squadron was equipped and dispatched (it cannot have been much more or less) it follows that by Hekatombaion 1 the first detachment had seen service for about $2\frac{1}{2}$ months ($60 \times 2\frac{1}{2} = 150$ T.) and the second for about $1\frac{1}{2}$ months ($40 \times 1\frac{1}{2} = 60$; $150 + 60 = 210$ T.).²⁸ In that case the Athenians responded to the revolt around the beginning of April 440, the investment of Samos occurring in the beginning of May.

(ii) The treasurers of 440/39 paid out 908 T. + for expenses incurred from mid-July 440. That is something more than $5\frac{1}{2}$ months' pay for a fleet of 160 triremes. Since we probably must allow for special expenses in what was an elaborate siege—50 T.—the siege probably lasted for little more than five months counting from mid-July, i.e. until January 439 B.C. We may therefore infer that Thucydides' eight-month-long siege was reckoned from the time of the first investment of Samos (early May) and not from Perikles' return from Karia.²⁹

The following approximate chronology³⁰ therefore emerges from the evidence of *IG* i² 293 and Thucydides in combination:

June–July 441:	Installation of the democracy.
March 440:	Samian Revolt.
Early April:	Athenian response to the revolt.
Early May:	Circumvallation of Samos.

²⁷ Sixty had been dispatched immediately (116.1), another forty followed 'later' (116.2); then came the sixty of 117.2.

²⁸ This calculation is not as arbitrary as it may perhaps appear: the range of possibility is limited absolutely by our knowledge of two key elements of the equation. Consider that if all 100 vessels had been present *ab initio*, the 308 T. paid in mid-July (subtracting 60 for the force arriving in mid-June) would have carried them for about three months, so that the Athenian response could have come no sooner than mid-April. From this point backwards the proportions are fixed. Thucydides' ὕστερον, for example, cannot mean 'after fifteen days' because, in that case, assuming that the offensive began on the 1st of April, 30 T. would have been spent in the first fifteen days and 300 in the next three months—22 T. too many. A date in March, i.e. a forty-five day hiatus, can similarly be excluded because if the campaign began on the 1st of

March, 90 T. would have been spent by the 15th of April, with another 300 to follow for the next three months. What is required, therefore, is a month's hiatus, the first squadron having been sent to Samos around the 1st of April, the reinforcement of forty vessels arriving around the 1st of May (60 T. + 100 T. + 100 T. + 50 T. = 310 T.).

²⁹ See above p. 9.

³⁰ Obviously, everything is plus or minus. On the one hand, the Athenians must have suffered some losses, which suggests that these events took somewhat longer, pay being distributed among fewer people. On the other, since I accept the literary figure of 1200 T. as the cost of reparations, I assume that 76 T. + were paid out in the aftermath of the war, when the new Samian democracy was established (for the date of which see below p. 17). In that case, a lesser amount would have been paid to the soldiery and the war will have been proportionately shorter.

- May–early June: Perikles' departure for Karia;
the fourteen-day Samian success;
rebellion of Byzantium (?);
reinvestment of Samos.
- Mid-June: Arrival of the newly-elected generals.
- Early January 439: End of the Samian War.

IV. IG 1² 50+

IG 1² 50+, as presently reconstituted (ML no. 56), consists of four fragments, one of which (*b*) records part of a treaty concluded between Athens and Samos. This much is clear from the presence in it of an oath of allegiance to Athens (lines 16 ff.) involving the Samians (lines 22, 23). Another of the fragments (*d*) names Tlempolemos, also the name of the general of 440/39 mentioned by Thucydides in i 117.2. On this evidence the inscription was traditionally dated in 440/39, the year of the end of the Samian War. In 1931 Wade-Gery (following Wilhelm) connected fragment *d* with another (*c*) which until then had been regarded simply as a fragment of a strategic list.³¹ By combining the two he was able to restore portions of the names of ten generals who were thus supposed to have 'sworn the oath'—presumably, one taken by the Athenians reciprocally with the Samians (cf. IG 1² 39.3 ff.).³² Since Wade-Gery's restoration required a line of 35 letter-spaces, fragment *b*, which had earlier been restored with a longer length of line (44 spaces), was modified accordingly. The text of *b*, *c* and *d* as published by Meiggs and Lewis is as follows:³³

- 15 [- - - - - δρ]-
[άσο καὶ ἐρῶ καὶ βολεύσο τῶι δέμοι τῶι Ἀθена]-
b [ἰόν ἡό τι ἂν δύνομαι καλὸν καὶ ἀ[γ]αθόν, [οὐδὲ ἀ]-
[ποστέσομαι ἀπὸ τῶ δέμο τῶ Ἀ]θенаῖον οὔτε λ[ό]-
[γοι οὔτε ἔργοι οὔτε³⁴ ἀπὸ τῶν] χουμμάχων τῶν Ἀ-
20 [θенаῖον, καὶ ἔσομαι πιστὸς τῶι δέμοι τῶι Ἀθ-
[εναῖον Ἀθенаῖος δ' ὁμόσαι· δρ]άσο καὶ ἐρῶ καὶ
[βολεύσο καλὸν τῶι δέμοι τῶι Σαμίον ἡό τι ἂν
[δύνομαι καὶ ἐπιμελέσομαι Σα]μίον κατὰ ἡὰ [.]
[.....25.....] Ἀθенаῖον [..]
25 [.....26.....] κρατε[....]
[- - - - -] λ [...6...]
lacuna
- c* [στ]ρατεγ[οὶ ὄμνον τὸν ἡόρκον Σοκράτες Ἐρε]-
χθείδος Δεμ[- - - - - Αἰγείδος - - - - - Πα]-
νδιονίδος Χ[.....10..... Λεοντίδος Περικλ]-
30 ἔς Γλαύκον Ἀ[καμαντίδος Καλλ]ί[στρατος Οἰ]-
d γείδος Χσε[νοφὸν Κεκροπίδ]ος Τλεμπ[όλεμος]
[Αἰαντίδος Ἀντιοχίδ]ος βολεῖ ἔρχε [....]
[.....16..... πρῶτ]ος ἐγραμμάτευε ἘΡα-
[μνόςσιος vacat] vacat

Since some of the generals now restored in this inscription are different from those of the year 440/39 named by Thucydides in i 117.2, they (and the treaty) have been placed in the year 439/8. If

³¹ CP xxvi (1931) 309–13. Wade-Gery used different letters from those now employed to designate the fragments (his *a*=*d*, *d*=*c*, *c*=*b*).

³² I am not clear whether Wade-Gery conceived the 'signatories' to be those who took an oath inscribed in the stele or some others who were 'guarantors' of the legitimacy of the treaty in some other sense. For the purposes of

this argument it does not greatly matter (though I do not believe that the second alternative is a real one).

³³ I do not reproduce the very fragmentary text of *a* (see PLATE Ia) since it does not affect this discussion.

³⁴ Now read οὐδέ with Alan Henry, *JHS* xcvi (1977) 156.

this late date, though quite surprising,³⁵ were the only difficulty raised by Wade-Gery's combination of the fragments, it could perhaps be tolerated. Unfortunately, it is the least of the problems created by this adventurous reconstruction; and all of them, taken collectively, provide sufficient reason to believe that this text must incorporate the fragments of more than one inscription.

That Wade-Gery's hypothetical text has remained immune to criticism since the time of its publication probably is due to the special kind of advocacy he employed. His argument was less substantive than stylistic. Thus, the likeness of the letters convinced him that *c* and *d* belonged together, and both of them with *a* and *b*, with which *d* had already been associated. Judging their stylistic and dimensional similarity 'conclusive', satisfied that 'There can be little question that the fragments are all from one stele',³⁶ it followed that the text, whatever it implied, was self-evidently one of integrity. Wade-Gery's assumption, however—and we now know that he was deceived in one important respect³⁷—is far from the 'proof' it has been called;³⁸ that word, indeed, can hardly be applied to a hypothesis that unnecessarily results in the creation of an intrinsically problematical text.

Let us begin with the two fragments which specifically attracted Wade-Gery, namely *c* and *d*. By uniting them he was able to construct a list of the ten Athenian generals. Does not, therefore, the question arise whether the newly obtained strategic list is better left by itself than included in the Samian decree (*a-b*)? The board of generals, *per se*, does not belong in the decree. For though there is a parallel for the inclusion of generals in agreements as oath-takers, no parallel exists for this imputed subscription of the entire college as the guarantors of a treaty. It was not the business of the strategic college to 'ratify' pacts on behalf of Athens, however often the generals may have been required, together with other military officials and the *boule*, to swear to uphold the terms of a pact.³⁹ In special circumstances, of course, Athenian generals, among others, could be required to ratify treaties. At Selymbria, for example, 'Athenian generals, [trierarchs,] hoplites, and any other Athenians present' (*IG* i² 116, lines 24–6, ML no. 87) swore an oath in 407 B.C. But generals, *qua* generals, much less the entire body of them, are manifestly inappropriate guarantors of the Samian treaty. In fact, the proper parties to such an oath would have been the members of the *boule* and the dicastic panel, as we know from the Chalcis decree (*IG* i² 39, ML no. 52), which dictated the procedures for an entirely similar situation only six years earlier: *κατὰ τὰδε τὸν ἡόρκον ὁμόσαι Ἀθηναίων τὴν βολὴν καὶ τοὺς δικαστάς* (lines 3 f.).

That Wade-Gery's join of *c-d* yields a strategic-list irrelevant to the Samian decree, or any other decree, also follows from the manner in which the generals have been identified. Their listing by tribe, not by demotic, is anomalous, inappropriate in a state document, where the official nomenclature is expected. On the other hand, tribal designation of the *strategoí* makes some sense in a purely internal document, where the affiliation retained local significance—perhaps as a survival of the days when every general was a member of the tribe he led—and demotics were at once superfluous and irrelevant.

³⁵ According to Meritt, *AFD* 52 f.: 'There is nothing surprising in this delay. The alliance between Perdikkas and Athens, which had its inception in the agreement between Perdikkas and the Athenian generals in the field in the autumn of 423 (Thuc. iv 132), was not consummated by formal alliance until the spring of 422. . . . Another instance of long deliberation before the ratification of a treaty is found in the negotiations between Argos and Athens, which extended from the summer of 417 to the spring of 416.' These exceptional cases involving sovereign equals jealous of their rights suggest the contrary of what Meritt supposed, for the establishment of a government by Athens in a conquered state implies a situation in which the Athenians had a free hand to do as they wished. As such, it is also to be differentiated from the process leading to the establishment of the first Samian democracy (above pp. 12–13), when the Athenians attempted a peaceful transition and enjoyed none of the privileges of conquest.

³⁶ *CP* xxvi (1931) 312.

³⁷ Wade-Gery supposed the 'distinctive dressing of the back surfaces . . . conclusive' (312 n. 1) but they are apparently not original and they differ in width (ML 152). Professor Norman Herz has examined the geological structure of the stones and has graciously permitted me to quote his conclusion that the geological structures allow a join for all four pieces. On the other hand (he noted), since the angle of foliation and the lineation (oriented top-bottom and perpendicular to the lettering) appear to be common orientations, no firm conclusion is possible.

³⁸ Meritt, *AFD* 49; cf. Wade-Gery 313 n. 1.

³⁹ The college, for example, did not act as a body in 421 (Thuc. v 19.2) and, for the fourth century, documents such as Tod nos. 103, 153, merely show that the generals, *boule* and knights (no. 103.10 f.) or the generals, *boule* and taxiarchs (no. 153.6 f.) were required to swear an oath of alliance. They were not signatories of the type envisaged by Wade-Gery.

The presence of the archaic expression *βολὲ ἔρχε* in fragment *d* points unmistakably in the same direction. The phrase unquestionably served as the dating formula for the stele of which *c-d* were a part. Such a formula should not have been used to supply the date of a mid-fifth century decree: the expression should not appear as a postscript, *βολέ* requires its article, and reference to the *demos* is mandatory.⁴⁰ Again, however, the fact that *d* thus resists emplacement in a *decree* of 439 does not necessarily make it inappropriate in a strategic-list of roughly the same date. Modernity may have been resisted in documents of the kind: it is not inconceivable that the old-fashioned way was retained in such lists, whether through habit or because it was felt to lend a certain dignity to the institution.

The difficulties thus far discussed are to a certain extent relative, and different people will allow them greater or lesser weight. However, the attempt to connect *c-d* with *a-b* leads also to a problem of another sort conclusively telling against the combination. The line of 35 letter-spaces, mandatory for a plausible reconstruction of the strategic-list⁴¹ (though inadequate for the rubric that begins it),⁴² is just a little too short for fragment *b* to work properly. Of this there are a number of signs, one of them recently noted by Alan Henry,⁴³ who pointed out that [οὐδὲ ἀ] | [πιστέσομαι, as restored in lines 17 f., is a solecism. As he emphasized, οὐδέ and μήδε join only negative clauses; what is minimally required here is [καὶ οὐκ ἀ] | [πιστέσομαι—two letters too many for a line of 35 letters. Secondly, as Hermann Wankel maintained,⁴⁴ the sole justification of the restoration of *καλόν* in line 22⁴⁵ is that it suits the length of line required. This word should be ruled out, however, because of the use of ἀ[γ]αθόν in the same formula in line 17: [ἡό τι ἄν δύνομαι καλόν κ]αὶ ἀ[γ]αθόν. Even if we suppose, with Wankel, that ἀγαθόν may have stood alone in both oaths (the preceding letters -αι- in line 17 then becoming the termination of δύνομαι and not of καί), we (again) must extend the line by two spaces. Probably, though, it is best to restore the double expression *καλόν καὶ ἀγαθόν* or *δίκαιον*⁴⁶ *καὶ ἀγαθόν*: the use of two such words mutually reinforcing each other, though not inevitable, is a well-known trait of such oaths—e.g. ἄριστος καὶ δικαίος|ατος (*IG* i² 39, lines 28 f.),⁴⁷ [ἀδόλος κ]αὶ [ἀβλα]βός (*IG* i² 52, line 23). Moreover, fragment *b* seems elsewhere to have suffered undue abbreviation by a minimum of nine letters. Thus we read ἔσομαι πιστός in line 20, where χσύμμαχος ἔσομαι πιστός had been read in the *Corpus*; again, in line 21, Ἀθηναίος δ' ὁμόσαι requires κατὰ τάδε (restored in *IG*) at the very least. In both these cases, as in the oath formula, we must keep in mind that it is not enough to 'make do' with a bare minimum of words; what is needed is normal prose and balance. Thus, although one cannot disprove a restoration, I think that it can be asserted with confidence that the length of line of fragment *b* required by its association with *c-d* gives every appearance of being too tight a fit by nine letters at the least.

For all these reasons, then, *a-b* are better left to themselves than attached to *c-d*. Nor is this conclusion as radical as it may perhaps appear. For fragment *d*, the pivotal fragment, was never securely locked to *a-b*. It was associated with them originally because it contained the name *Tlempolemos* and seemed also to possess compatible lettering. *Wade-Gery's* concern to connect *d* with *c*, furthermore, clearly transcended his interest in questioning the exact relationship of *d* with *a-b* or in resolving any problems the new length of line might pose in the restoration of *b*. He was content to write, for example, that: 'Consequently [i.e. because of the new length of line], the supplements suggested for fragment *c* [= *b*] . . . (which presupposes a considerably longer line),

⁴⁰ A similar formula occurs in the (probably) late sixth-century decree *IG* i² 1 (ML no. 14) where, as in *d*, it appears as a postscript: [ἐπ]ὶ τῆς β[ο]λέ[ς] (line 12). Reference in a decree to the *boule* alone recurs in 411: see [Plut.] *Vit. X Orat.* 833 d and ML 249 (on *IG* ii² 12+).

⁴¹ Even so, the list is very hypothetical. No tribe names are preserved in *d*, *Kallistratos'* name needs to be misspelled, and a scant four letters are allowed for the name of one of the generals.

⁴² *στ]ρατεγ[ο]ὶ ὄμνον τὸν ἡόρκον* is too abbreviated to have stood alone. We need *στ]ρατεγ[ο]ὶ Ἀθηναίων ἡοῖδε ὄμνον τὸν ἡόρκον*: and if Ἀθηναίων be dispensed with, which seems inadmissible, ἡοῖδε cannot be. Cf. e.g. ML no. 37 b (*IG* i² 20, line 1).

⁴³ *JHS* xcvi (1977) 156. I am grateful to Professor Henry for his readiness to provide me with a copy of his paper before its publication.

⁴⁴ *ZPE* xv (1974) 251.

⁴⁵ *δρ]άσο καὶ ἐρό καὶ | [βολέ]σο καλόν τῶι δέμοι τῶι Σαμίον ἡό τι ἄν | [δύ]νομαι.*

⁴⁶ Wankel pointed out, *op. cit.* 249–54, that *καλόν* is not attested in oath-formulae of the fifth century, and he may well be right to prefer *δίκαιον* as the correlative of *ἀγαθόν* when, as in the Kolophon decree (*ATL* ii D 15 line 43) and here, a brace of such words was used.

⁴⁷ Cf. *IG* i² 10, lines 21 f. (ML no. 40), quoted below p. 18.

will have to be revised. There seems little difficulty about restoring 35 letters *exempli gratia*, though I have no suggestions worth printing, and find line 27 especially stubborn.⁴⁸ But he was well aware, at the same time, of certain significant variations in the lettering. These now deserve consideration.

Although there can be no doubt about the general similarity of the letters and their spacing, differences exist between *a-b* and *c-d*. The most obvious is displayed in the punctuation. Fragment *a* (line 12) contains a stop consisting of two dots.⁴⁹ In *c-d* the marks invariably consist of three. Secondly, the middle strokes of *mu* in *d* differ in length from those of *a-b*. As Wade-Gery recognized,⁵⁰ all those of *d* are carried down to the base-line. The inside strokes are two millimetres longer than those of *b*. The shape of *mu* in *a-b* is also more open (M̂) than that of *d* (M̄), the difference at the base being about one millimetre. (On the other hand, there is no doubt that the *mu* in *c* is very like those of *a-b*.) Omicron is another letter possessing a slightly different shape. Though its height is the same in all the fragments (something which is true of all the letters), the width of *omicron* in *b* ranges from 8½–9 millimetres while it measures 7½ in *d*. In general, though all the letters in *b* and *d* are definitely of the same basic dimensions, those of *d* are consistently on the low side of the continuum. Finally, it is not an overstatement to assert that the general appearance of *d* seems neater and more elegant than that of *b*.⁵¹

How important are these sometimes trivial variations, especially when they must be measured off against indisputable similarities? I do not see how one can dogmatically discount them: a hypothesis based on style is allowed no clear-cut exceptions (however often differences can be observed between the same letters on inscriptions indisputably integral), and the different punctuation mark and the discrepant *mus* can be regarded in no other light. Again, the very slight diversity in fragments *b* and *d* appears consistent while, on the other hand, the similarities may in part be purely mechanical—i.e. dictated by the use of the same stoichedon pattern. Indeed, the important question is whether the stylistic similarities of the fragments may also have been common to other inscriptions as well. And, as it happens, several other fragments exist with apparently indistinguishable lettering and similar stoichedon patterns.⁵² These, which will be published together as IG i³ 145, require at least a 48-letter line. They could therefore either be part of *a-b* or yet a third example of an inscription with similar lettering.⁵³ In the face of all this, then, it is reasonable firmly to dissociate *c-d* from *a-b*. The desirability of that combination is more than counterbalanced by the improbabilities and difficulties—substantive and stylistic—the association generates. It is best to keep *c-d* as a self-contained strategic list and *a-b* as a part of the regulations propounded for the Samians after the end of the Great Revolt.

V. THE 'ATHENIAN OATH' OF IG I² 50, LINES 21 FF.

Before leaving this decree—which now may be dated back again to 440/39—one final matter deserves attention. Lines 21 ff. contain an oath assigned to the Athenians. In it they pledge their loyalty to the Samian government in terms elsewhere employed by Athens' subjects. This astonishing feature was noted by Meiggs and Lewis, who speak of the 'positive undertaking to look after the interests of the Samian demos. Athens (and perhaps we could say Pericles) seems to have decided that the wisest policy was to pin her faith on a democratic government at Samos; this perhaps helps to explain why the Samian democrats remained faithful to the bitter end.'⁵⁴ Some such explanation seems required—or would be, if 'Ἀθηναίος δ' ὁμόσαι were not wholly restored. It is a great deal to swallow. The oath imputed to the Athenians entails, after all, considerably more than a 'positive undertaking' to regard the Samian democracy with favour: it is an act of allegiance confirmed by oath setting the interests of another government on the same level as

⁴⁸ CP xxvi (1931) 312.

⁴⁹ See PLATE I, reproduced from squeezes that were very kindly provided me by Mr John McK. Camp, II.

⁵⁰ P. 312, quoting Homer Thompson.

⁵¹ See PLATE I.

⁵² I am indebted to David Lewis for this information. The fragments were published in *Hesp.* xiv (1945) 94–7,

EM 5197 and Ag. I 658 (now EM 13370).

⁵³ Unfortunately, I can find nothing in the (meagre) text of these fragments that ties them into the Samian decree.

⁵⁴ ML 153.

⁵⁵ I return to a line of 44 letters; see however n. 46.

those of Athens itself. For that is inevitably implied in the formulaic words $\delta\rho\lambda\acute{\alpha}\sigma\omicron\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \acute{\epsilon}\rho\omicron\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ |\ [\beta\omicron\lambda\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\omicron\ \kappa\alpha\lambda\omicron\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\omicron\ \tau\omicron\iota\ \delta\acute{\epsilon}\mu\omicron\iota\ \tau\omicron\iota\] \Sigma\alpha\mu\acute{\iota}\omicron\ \eta\acute{\omicron}\ \tau\iota\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\ |\ [\delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\omicron\mu\alpha\iota].$ ⁵⁵ It is a great deal to attribute to the Athenians, especially on the basis of mere restoration.

This particular restoration undoubtedly recommended itself because the preserved portion of line 22 required that the party taking the oath swear loyalty to the Samians. The party, however, need not have been Athenian rather than Samian; and that it can have been the latter is easily shown. In the first place, nothing stands in the way of assuming that the oath contained in lines 15–21 was sworn by the entire Samian community. Compare the requirement of the Chalcis decree (IG i² 39, ML no. 52) by which ‘all male Chalcidian adults’ (lines 32 f.) are required to swear the oath contained in lines 21–32. The situation at Chalcis was entirely comparable to that of Samos and only six years earlier. In that case, we are at liberty to assume that the following oath, here at issue, was in fact the bouleutic oath of the Samians themselves. As a standard precautionary measure against possible counter-revolution, the Samian *bouleutai* were required to affirm their loyalty to the newly established democracy. We may compare the bouleutic oath of the Athenians themselves: $\tau\acute{\alpha}\ \beta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\tau\iota\sigma\tau\alpha\ \beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\epsilon\upsilon\omicron\ \tau\acute{\omega}\ \delta\acute{\eta}\mu\omega\ \tau\acute{\omega}\ \acute{\Lambda}\theta\eta\eta\alpha\acute{\iota}\omicron\omega\upsilon\omicron\upsilon\omicron.$ ⁵⁶ And, as a parallel for what the Athenians demanded of the newly organized Samian *bouleutai*, we turn to the Erythrae Decree, IG i² 10, ML no. 40, lines 21–3. This, a fairly legible portion of Fauvel’s copy, reads as follows (as in ML): $\acute{\omicron}\mu\upsilon\upsilon\gamma\alpha\iota\ [\delta\acute{\epsilon}\ \tau\acute{\alpha}\delta\epsilon\ \tau\acute{\epsilon}\nu\beta\omicron\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \beta\omicron\lambda\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\omicron\ \eta\omicron\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\ \delta\upsilon\upsilon\omicron\gamma\omicron\mu\alpha\iota\ \acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\sigma\tau\alpha\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \delta\iota\kappa\alpha\iota\omicron\tau\alpha\ \acute{\epsilon}\rho\upsilon\theta\eta\alpha\acute{\iota}\omicron\ \tau\omicron\iota\ \pi\acute{\lambda}\acute{\epsilon}\theta\epsilon\iota\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \acute{\Lambda}\theta\eta\eta\alpha\acute{\iota}\omicron\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\upsilon\ \chi\sigma\upsilon\upsilon\mu\acute{\alpha}\chi\omicron\ \kappa\tau\lambda.$ Consequently, still assuming a line of 44 letters, we may remove $\acute{\Lambda}\theta\eta\eta\alpha\acute{\iota}\omicron\varsigma\ \delta\acute{\epsilon}\ \acute{\omicron}\mu\omicron\sigma\alpha\iota\ \kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\alpha}\ \tau\acute{\alpha}\delta\epsilon$ and substitute $\acute{\omicron}\mu\omicron\sigma\alpha\iota\ \delta\acute{\epsilon}\ \tau\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \beta\omicron\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\alpha}\ \tau\acute{\alpha}\delta\epsilon$. But the restoration, like all such, is of no importance: what matters is that it is open to us to conceive of this oath not as a paradox but as a routine requirement imposed by the Athenians on the Samians themselves.⁵⁷

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ADDITIONAL NOTE

Since the publication-date of IG i³ is still uncertain, it may help Fornara’s readers to extract here IG i³ 145.

Duo fragmenta inter se coniungentia: *a*, in foro inventum (Ag. I 658), nunc EM 13370, a. 0,245, l. 0,146; *b*, in arce (?), nunc EM 5197, a. 0,22, l. 0,11. Ambo supra integra, cum cymatii vestigiis. Cr. (in cymatio) 0,075, (in inscriptione) 0,065; tergum fortasse pristinum est. Composuit Meritt, coniunctionem indicavit Lewis, fecit Vanderpool.

Litt. Att. crassae et vulgares, a. 0,01–0,012, non accurate *στοιχηδόν* scriptae, fere 0,0225, 0,014. Lapidica idem n. 48 incidit. Phot. (ect.) Hesperia 14 p. 86.

Ed. Meritt, Hesperia 14, 1945, 94–7 (SEG X 51). Alia fragmenta ibi tractata hic nn. 157, 221, 212, 213 invenies. EM 5197 numerum IG I² 141*d* dedit Hiller, non tamen edidit.

a. 440–430

ΣΤΟΙΧ.

[ἔδοχσεν τῆι βολῆι καὶ τοῖ δέμοι· - - ἰς ἐπ]ρυτάνε[νε,·] / [- -]
 [- - ἐγραμμάτευε - - ἐπεστάτ]ε, Χρόμον [εἶ]πε· το[- -]
 [- - - - -] δέμο ἠὲ κευρόντ[αι - -]
 [- - - - -] μέτε κηπ[ὸ] τοῖς τ[- -]
 5 [- - - - -]ς καὶ τ... |§[- -]
 [- - - - -]ς...]τες [- - -]

Margo dextra definiri non potest; vv. non minus quam 48 litt. 1–3 ΠΥΤΑ, ΕΧΡΟ, ΔΕΜΟ alia sub alia disposita sunt.

At the time that the join was made (originally from squeezes), D. W. Bradeen and I agreed that we could not, on stoichedon pattern and letter-forms, distinguish the text from the Samian

⁵⁶ See Rhodes, *Athenian Boule* 194 f.

⁵⁷ I owe a debt of gratitude to D. M. Lewis for his stringent criticism of this paper and for his generosity in


providing me with relevant information. He is, of course, in no way responsible for the views expressed, nor should his agreement be inferred.

Treaty, but the line-length seemed an insurmountable obstacle. Fornara's observations on the line-length of the oath obviously bring the text back into consideration. On appeal, Professor A. E. Raubitschek and Mme D. Peppas-Delmousou, to whom I am deeply grateful, assembled the fragments in May 1977. They agree with Meiggs and Lewis against the earlier view that the backs were original and that the stele tapered. Our view was based on the fact that the fragments showed a tendency to split horizontally, but they point out that there has also been some wear. Without seeing any clear reason for dissociating the list of generals, they (and the Museum technicians) agree that *IG* i³ 145 could be the top of the stele. 'There are differences in the size and shape of **E**, **P**, **M**, **O**, but these occur also within fragments. There is no join, but only a small piece may be missing. The marble, especially of frag. *a* of *IG* i² 50, is very similar.'

It can only be hoped that new evidence will resolve the matter. It is as yet not easy to see how what survives of *IG* i³ 145 could be the beginning of the Samian Treaty, and I am not myself much convinced as yet by Fornara's general arguments for separating the list of generals from the Treaty. On the text of the Treaty, Bradeen and McGregor, *Studies in Fifth-century Attic Epigraphy* 120-1, should also be consulted.

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
(a)



(b)



(c)



(d)

IG 12 50+, fragments a, b, c, d (from squeezes).
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